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Note
The Preemptive Power of Federal Patent Law:
A Framework for Analyzing State Antitrust
Challenges to Pay-for-Delay Settlements
Caroline Marsili*
Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act (the Act) in
1984,1 patent litigation in the pharmaceutical industry has
generated a troubling breed of settlement agreements wherein
the payment goes from patentee plaintiffs to allegedly
infringing defendants, resulting in anticompetitive effects.2 The
provisions of the Act, though intended to promote innovation
and lower drug prices while expediting infringement litigation,
tend to incentivize reverse payments, or pay-for-delay
settlements.3 The settlements are often challenged by the
© 2013 Caroline Marsili
* J.D. Candidate (2014), University of Minnesota Law School. The author
would like to thank Professor Thomas F. Cotter for inspiring the topic of this
note and for providing invaluable guidance throughout the note-writing
process, Emily Puchalski for her excellent feedback on every draft, and the
editors and staff of MJLST for their hard work and dedication. The author
also thanks friends and family for their patience and support.
1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (HatchWaxman) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); Gregory Dolin, Reverse
Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 286
(2011).
2. See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“[I]n the years after the passage of Hatch-Waxman, some of the patent
infringement suits occurring under the Hatch-Waxman framework were
resolved through settlement agreements in which the patent holder paid the
would-be generic manufacturer to drop its patent challenge and refrain from
producing a generic drug for a specified period. These agreements are known
as ‘reverse payment agreements’ or ‘exclusion agreements.’”); 12 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 337 (3d ed. 2006); Michael A.
Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive
Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 37 (2009); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the
“Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving
Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1789, 1797 (2003).
3. 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 340–41; Cotter, supra note
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and by private parties for
violation of antitrust law.4 Thus, pay-for-delay settlements
illustrate a tension between patent law and antitrust law.5
Since the adoption of the Act, courts have struggled to
harmonize the two bodies of law with regard to pay-for-delay
settlements, as evidenced by the widely divergent rulings on
the legality of these settlements among regional circuit courts.6
In December 2012, the Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari to review Federal Trade Commission v. Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,7 an Eleventh Circuit case favoring the
pharmaceutical companies,8 and should enunciate the proper
legal standard to apply to pay-for-delay settlements.

2, at 1797–802.
4. See Paula L. Blizzard et al., Antitrust, in AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, ANDA LITIGATION: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LITIGATORS 293, 304–24 (Kenneth L. Dorsney et al.
eds., 2012).
5. For a detailed analysis of the tension between antitrust law and
patent law in the context of pay-for-delay settlements, see, for example, Alden
F. Abbott & Susan T. Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy and
Intellectual Property Law: A Perspective on Settlements of Pharmaceutical
Patent Litigation, in PRACTISING LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ANTITRUST 387, 393 (2006). For a summary of the tension between antitrust
law and intellectual property law in general, see CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE,
ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 39–86 (2011).
6. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209–14; 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 15-30 to 15-49 (2d ed. Supp. 2012); Michael
A. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent
Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1–5 (2012).
7. FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012),
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012). The Eleventh Circuit held that the
appropriate test for pay-for-delay settlements is “absent sham litigation or
fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from
antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of
the exclusionary potential of the patent.” Id. at 1312.
8. Id. at 1315. The Supreme Court chose to hear Watson in lieu of
another case with a certiorari petition, In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 197, where
the Third Circuit found pay-for-delay settlements “presumptively
anticompetitive.” See Kevin E. Noonan, FTC Asks Supreme Court to Play
Favorites in Reverse Payment Settlement Agreement Cases, PATENTDOCS.ORG
(Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/10/ftc-asks-supreme-court-toplay-favorites-in-reverse-payment-settlement-agreement-cases.html; Kevin E.
Noonan, Supreme Court to Review Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements,
PATENTDOCS.ORG (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/12/supremecourt-to-review-reverse-payment-settlement-agreements.html.
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Whether a court finds a pay-for-delay settlement illegal
often reflects the extent to which the court defers to federal
patent law—the greater the deference to patent law, the more
likely a finding of legality.9 Challenges to pay-for-delay
settlements have thus far been adjudicated almost exclusively
in federal court,10 but these challenges are brought under both
federal and state antitrust laws, and one challenge is currently
awaiting rehearing by the Supreme Court of California.11
Should pay-for-delay settlements be challenged in state courts
in the future, the doctrine of preemption may pose an obstacle
for state antitrust claims confronting the legality of patent
infringement settlements.12
This Note explores the applicability of the doctrine of
preemption to state antitrust claims challenging pay-for-delay
settlements. Part I of this Note outlines the history and current
status of pay-for-delay settlements, draws attention to
potential areas of conflict between antitrust law and patent
law, and reviews principles of preemption as enunciated by the
Supreme Court. Part II explores the applicability of the
doctrine of preemption to state antitrust challenges to pay-fordelay-settlements and proposes a framework for determining
whether state antitrust law is preempted by federal patent law.
This Note concludes that state antitrust claims are likely not
preempted by federal patent law in the context of pay-for-delay
settlements, nor should they be in light of policy concerns.

9. See Carrier, supra note 6, at 1–2 (“Courts have analyzed [pay-fordelay settlements] by relying on a test that asks if the settlement falls within
the ‘scope of the patent.’ They have found, in nearly all of these cases, that it
does. And, as a result, they have concluded that the agreements do not violate
the antitrust laws.”). Cf. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-36 (“The
Eleventh Circuit reasoned from the premise that a valid patent gives its owner
a right to exclude to the conclusion that the payment for exclusion was not an
unwarranted extension of the patent.”).
10. One exception, and the inspiration for this Note, is discussed in note
12, infra.
11. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted,
269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012); Bernice Yeung, State Court to Examine “Pay-forDelay” Deals by Drugmakers, CAL. WATCH (Mar. 2, 2012), http://california
watch.org/dailyreport/state-court-examine-pay-delay-deals-drugmakers-15133.
12. The Supreme Court made many preemption decisions in the first
decade of the twenty-first century, and though these decisions have not been
entirely consistent or clear, they have demonstrated that the Court considers
preemption a valuable instrument in assessing the balance of state and
federal power in various fields. See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the
Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Robert’s Court, 2011 SUP.
CT. REV. 253, 253–57 (2012).
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I. A PARALLEL HISTORY OF PAY-FOR-DELAY
SETTLEMENTS AND PREEMPTION OF
FEDERAL PATENT LAW
A. ANDA LITIGATION AND PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS
The Act creates a series of incentives that make settlement
an attractive option to both pioneering and generic
pharmaceutical companies involved in Abbreviated New Drug
Applications (ANDA) litigation.13 The settlement agreements
have been challenged for violating antitrust laws, with
disparate results among federal circuit courts.14 The status of
these settlements is contested and uncertain.15
1. The Hatch-Waxman Act
Before the Act was passed, there was a significant gap
between the time that a patent expired on a pioneer’s drug and
the time that a generic manufacturer was able to market its
version of the drug.16 In response to the need to promote
pioneering in the pharmaceutical industry and to introduce
low-cost generic versions of new drugs at the expiration of the
pioneer’s patent, Congress passed the Act in 1984.17 The Act
made changes to patent law and to the United States Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approval process for new drug
products in an effort to both protect the exclusive patent rights
of pioneering drug companies and encourage the entry of lower13. See supra text accompanying note 3. “Pioneer” will be used to refer to
a drug company that is the first to patent and market a drug.
14. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1330 (5th ed. 2011).
15. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-48 to 15-49.
16. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 14, at 1329.
17. See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
(Hatch-Waxman) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (“To amend the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to revise the procedures for new drug
applications, to amend title 35, United States Code, to authorize the extension
of the patents for certain regulated products, and for other purposes.”); 12
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 338 (“The 1984 Hatch-Waxman
legislation attempted to balance the pioneer drug manufacturers’ innovation
incentives against the need to facilitate market entry by manufacturers of
equivalent generic products.”); James M. Lennon et al., Statutory and
Regulatory Scheme, in AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW,
supra note 4, at 1. The Act was also a response to the 1962 amendments to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA); these amendments created the
requirement that new products be proven safe and effective by the FDA, which
discouraged market-entry of generic companies. Lenon et al., supra, at 2.
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cost generic drugs into the market.18 First, the Act created the
ANDA.19 The ANDA process is a means for expediting FDA
approval of a generic drug that is the bioequivalent20 of a
patented brand-name drug.21 When a generic company files an
ANDA, it must certify
[e]ither that no patent was filed for the listed drug (a “paragraph I”
certification), that the patent has expired (a “paragraph II”
certification), that the patent will expire on a specified date and the
ANDA filer will not market the drug until that date (a “paragraph
III” certification), or that the patent is invalid or would not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug (a
“paragraph IV” certification).22

The Act also amended the Patent Act of 1980 to extend the
patent term for new pharmaceuticals.23 The extension of the
18. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-24 to 15-25.
19. 98 Stat. at 1585; Kenneth L. Dorsney, Preface to AM. BAR ASS’N
SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, supra note 4, at xxi.
20. The ANDA applicant must present evidence in its application that its
generic drug has the same active ingredient as the patent-holder’s drug.
Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 18–19. (“[B]ioequivalence is established by
showing that the generic drug does not significantly differ in the rate and
extent to which the active ingredient becomes available in the body or at the
site of action as compared to the NDA drug.”). “Bioequivalence” is statulorily
defined as follows:
(B) A drug shall be considered to be bioequivalent to a listed drug if—
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a
significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the
listed drug when administered at the same molar dose of the
therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions in
either a single dose or multiple doses; or (ii) the extent of absorption
of the drug does not show a significant difference from the extent of
absorption of the listed drug when administered at the same molar
dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental
conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses and the difference
from the listed drug in the rate of absorption of the drug is
intentional, is reflected in its proposed labeling, is not essential to the
attainment of effective body drug concentrations on chronic use, and
is considered medically insignificant for the drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B) (2006).
21. Dorsney, supra note 19, at xxi.
22. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir.
2006) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006)). See, e.g., Roger D. Blair &
Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47
ANTITRUST BULL. 491, 505–06 (2002); Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 12. The
“paragraph IV certification constitutes a technical act of patent infringement,”
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)(A) (2006)), in which the ANDA applicant asserts that the existing
patent is either invalid or not infringed. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006).
23. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (HatchWaxman) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (1984); see also Lennon
et al., supra note 17, at 5 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act specifies that the term of a
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patent term benefits patentee companies that seek to file a
New Drug Application (NDA);24 these filers have drugs which
may be delayed from entering the market due to the FDA
review process.25 The extension benefits NDA filers because it
allows NDA filers to recover up to five years on the life of their
patent for administrative delays.26 The patent term extension
applies to patents claiming “products, methods of
manufacturing, and methods of use for human and veterinary
drugs, medical devices, and food additives.”27
Perhaps most importantly, the Act created a framework for
resolving patent disputes in the pharmaceutical industry.28
This framework consists of several critical innovations. First,
the Act created a “listing” requirement for the pioneering drug
companies.29 This provision requires NDA filers to list “any
patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted
the application or which claimed the method of using such a
patent covering [New Drug Application] inventions can be extended to make
up for patent life lost during the approval process for the patented drug.”). The
patent term was extended for products or methods of use of manufacture of
products if
(1) the term of the patent has not expired before an application is
submitted under subsection (d) for its extension; (2) the term of the
patent has never been extended; (3) an application for extension is
submitted by the owner of record of the patent or its agent and in
accordance with the requirements of subsection (d); (4) the product
has been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial
marketing or use; (5)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
permission for the commercial marketing or use of the product after
such regulatory review period is the first permitted commercial
marketing or use of the product under the provision of law under
which such regulatory review period occurred . . . . The product
referred to in paragraphs (4) and (5) is hereinafter in this section
referred to as the ‘approved product’. (b) The rights derived from any
patent the term of which is extended under this section shall during
the period during which the patent is extended—(1) in the case of a
patent which claims a product, be limited to any use approved for the
approved product before the expiration of the term of the patent
under the provision of law under which the applicable regulatory
review occurred . . . .
98 Stat. at 1598.
24. Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 5.
25. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 22, at 502–04.
26. Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 5.
27. Id.; see supra note 23.
28. 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 338; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 15-25; Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 4.
29. 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 338; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 15-25.
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drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement
could reasonably be asserted . . . .”30 Second, the Act provided
for a thirty-month stay of FDA approval of the generic drug,
upon filing of an infringement suit by the pioneer.31 When a
generic drug company files an ANDA, the pioneer has forty-five
days to sue for infringement, or else the ANDA approval
becomes effective immediately thereafter.32 However, if the
pioneer drug company brings suit, ANDA approval will not be
effective until the end of a thirty-month stay period (with some
exceptions).33 Finally, the Act gives the first generic to file an
ANDA a 180-day exclusivity period in the market upon
expiration (or finding of invalidity) of the pioneer’s patent.34
This provision gives the first generic manufacturer to file an
ANDA the exclusive right to commercialize the product for 180
days upon the expiration of the pioneer’s patent, or, if the
pioneer’s patent is found invalid, 180 days from the court
decision, whichever comes first.35
2. The Origins of ANDA Litigation
The pay-for-delay settlements encouraged by the Act follow
a basic pattern in which the plaintiff in a patent infringement
suit (the pioneering drug company) pays a settlement to the
defendant (the generic company) upon agreement that
defendant will delay commercialization of its product.36 These
pay-for-delay settlements may appeal to both parties under the
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006); see also 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 2, at 339 n.66 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006)).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2,
at 338–39; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-25.
32. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 1527 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006)).
33. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-27 (“If a court concludes in a
final decision that the patent is invalid or not infringed prior to the expiration
of the 30-month stay, ANDA approval is effective as of the date of that court
decision.” (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (2006))).
34. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (HatchWaxman) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1589 (1984); see 12 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 339; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 1525; Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 22.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 1528 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006)).
36. See, e.g., 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 338; 1
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-24; Alden F. Abbott & Susan T.
Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy and Intellectual Property
Law: A Perspective on Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, in
PRACTISING LAW INST., supra note 5, at 387, 393 (2006).
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Act’s framework.37 The generic company may accept a
settlement payment and in return agree to delay entry into the
market for some time.38 This delays the generic company’s 180day exclusivity period and thereby keeps other generic
companies from entering the market.39
To illustrate the incentives for settlement, consider In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,40 in which a pioneer drug
company had a patent on a drug, a generic drug company filed
an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for their version of
that drug, and the pioneer drug company filed suit.41 During
litigation over infringement of the pioneer company’s drug
patent, the parties entered an agreement in which the pioneer
company paid the generic company $10 million per quarter to
delay entry into the market.42 Litigation was prolonged, the
180-day exclusivity period for the generic company was
postponed, and other generic companies were barred from
entering the market for this time.43
Under this agreement, both parties were better off than
they would have been if they had litigated the case to
completion. Both would have spent time and money on
litigating the case, the pioneer drug company was able to
extend its monopoly, and the generic got paid, perhaps more
than it would have profited from actually manufacturing the
drug.44
Because of incentives for collusive settlements, the FTC
requires disclosure of pay-for-delay settlements, to screen for
37. For an explanation of how the provisions of the Act incentivize sham
litigation, see Blair & Cotter, supra note 22, at 506–10.
38. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 2, at 39.
39. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-29.
40. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
41. Id. at 901–02.
42. Id. at 903.
43. Id. at 904.
44. Cf. Carrier, supra note 2, at 39–40. See also Abbott & Michel, supra
note 5, at 414–15. Under the Hatch-Waxman framework,
generic drugs sell for less than their branded counterparts, [so]
generic entry causes the branded company to lose more in profits than
the generic company earns, with the difference accruing as consumer
savings . . . . A brand company could pay a generic to delay market
entry more than it would earn by entering, and still be better off than
if it faced competition . . . . [T]he brand firm and its generic rival are
always better off eliminating their expected competition and sharing
the brand’s monopoly profits.
Id. at 414.
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anticompetitive effects.45 FTC studies on these settlements
reveal that settlement payments often pass from pioneer to
generic manufacturer, and range in the tens of millions of
dollars.46 The FTC has recognized the severity of this problem,
noting that “[i]n Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, the number of
potentially anticompetitive patent dispute settlements between
branded and generic drug companies increased significantly
compared with FY 2011, jumping from 28 to 40 . . . .”47 The
FTC suggests that these settlements cost American consumers
$3.5 billion annually.48
3. The IP/Antitrust Interface
Patent law and antitrust law can clash with regards to
their underlying policy considerations.49 Patent law protects
individual property rights of inventors in order to promote
innovation and competition, while antitrust seeks to prevent
monopoly power and anticompetitive behavior.50 Pay-for-delay
settlements illustrate this tension, as they may produce
anticompetitive effects that harm consumers.51 However, in
those cases where patent settlements may produce
anticompetitive effects, the settlements are susceptible to
antitrust analysis.52
In considering the purposes of the antitrust laws, it seems
Congress intended to protect competition and prevent
monopoly.53 However, as Areeda and Hovenkamp describe in
45. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-30.
46. Id.
47. FTC Study: In FY 2012, Branded Drug Firms Significantly Increased
the Use of Potential Pay-for-Delay Settlements to Keep Generic Competitors off
the Market, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2013/01/mmarpt.shtm.
48. Id.
49. See generally Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and
Antitrust, 13 SW. J.L. & TRADE AMERICAS 237, 238–45, 253–56 (2007)
(discussing the nature and purposes of IP and antitrust law and arguing for
an equal balance between the two bodies of law).
50. See Abbott & Michel, supra note 5, at 391–92. But see Lemley, supra
note 49, at 1–9. Lemley acknowledges the tension exists in some situations,
but finds the goals of the two systems are not really in conflict. Id. at 9–17.
51. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. It should be noted that
settlements of patent disputes in general have the potential to produce
procompetitive effects, through both benefit to consumers and judicial
efficiency. See Abbott & Michel, supra note 5, at 392–93.
52. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 14, at 1330; infra Part I.A.4.
53. See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 3 (3d
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their treatise, “the principle objective of antitrust policy is to
maximize consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave
competitively while yet permitting them to take advantage of
every available economy that comes from internal or jointly
created production efficiencies, or from innovation producing
new processes or new or improved products.”54 However, the
authors note that the antitrust laws are specifically designed to
protect competition, and not to address the detrimental
outcomes that may result.55 The Sherman Act was the first
federal statement of the antitrust laws, which was meant to
codify the pre-existing state competition laws, and the drafters
of the Sherman Act were concerned with injury to competitors
caused by monopoly pricing.56
States have their own antitrust laws that largely overlap
with the regulations of the Sherman Act, though states may
impose stricter or more lenient regulations than federal
antitrust laws.57 These state laws may be preempted in
situations where they allow something that federal law
prohibits, or they prohibit something that federal law
permits,58 the latter being the more usual case.59
Antitrust challenges to the legality of pay-for-delay
settlements generally arise under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
which states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.”60 However, “the Supreme Court has long
ed. 2006) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951)).
54. Id. at 4.
55. The laws do not purport to remedy the negative results of competition,
including increased income inequality, losses due to failed risks, and displaced
human capital and infrastructure. See id. at 6.
56. See id. at 9–10. Though it should be noted that the framers of the Act
did not necessarily distinguish between these two injured parties. See id. at
52–53. For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of the Sherman Act,
see id. at 42–63. Areeda and Hovenkamp ultimately conclude that the
legislative history should be given little weight in crafting policy implications
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 59.
57. See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 339; cf. California v.
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989) (“Congress intended the federal
antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies.”).
58. See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 339.
59. Id. at 347.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d
197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) (listing section 1 of the Sherman Act as the “general
antitrust standard”).
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construed [section 1] to prohibit only unreasonable
restraints.”61 Courts may take one of several different
approaches in determining whether an unreasonable restraint
on trade exists, namely the per se rule, the rule of reason
analysis, and the quick look approach.62 Usually, a court will
apply the rule of reason approach, in which the fact finder
determines whether a practice restrains competition in light of
relevant market factors.63 Courts treat some conduct as per se
illegal if the conduct is very likely to result in anticompetitive
effects.64 Courts may apply the intermediate “quick look”
approach in cases where the conduct is similar to that which
requires the per se treatment.65
In the case of pay-for-delay settlements, the contested
conduct may be actions of the pioneer drug company plaintiff,
or the pioneer and generic drug company defendant together,
that results in the delayed entry of the generic competitor into
the market.66 However, patent law allows the pioneer patentee
to exclude others from making, using, and selling the patented
drug.67 Therefore, under patent law, the plaintiff should be able

61. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209.
62. See LESLIE, supra note 5, at 26–27.
63. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). The fact-finder
decides “whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint
on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific
information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” Id.
Further, under this approach, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving
that the activity has anticompetitive market effects, the defendant then must
show that the activity promotes a pro-competitive goal, and lastly, the plaintiff
then has a chance to show that the activity is not necessary to promote the
pro-competitive goal. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209.
64. See, e.g., In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209; LESLIE, supra note 5, at 26
(“The per se rule is categorical; if an agreement falls in a per se category, then
the agreement violates Section One, without any analysis of the agreement’s
actual effect on competitive conditions.”). California’s Cartwright Act follows
the Sherman Act in this respect, categorizing certain agreements as illegal per
se if they “have a pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming
virtue.” In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442, 467 (2011), rev.
granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012).
65. See, e.g., In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209. In the context of pay-for-delay
settlements, the plaintiff shifts the burden to the defendant by showing that
the payment went to the generic company and caused delay of the generic
product’s entry to the market, after which the defendant must prove the
settlement was pro-competitive or competitively neutral. See Blair & Cotter,
supra note 22, at 534.
66. See, e.g., Blizzard et al., supra note 4, at 293.
67. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
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to enter into agreements that do not extend its exclusionary
power beyond the protection of the patent.68
Though these antitrust claims contesting the legality of
pay-for-delay settlements are brought under the Sherman Act,
federal law only allows monetary damages for direct
purchasers of the patented drug.69 This means that end
consumers and other indirect purchasers may not recover
damages in antitrust challenges brought under the Sherman
Act, though they do have the option of injunctive relief.70
However, many state antitrust statutes reward damages to
indirect purchasers.71 Therefore, in many pay-for-delay

68. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th
Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2003).
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,
734–35 (1977); Blizzard et al., supra note 4, at 303. In order for a private
plaintiff (any plaintiff other than the U.S. government) to be eligible for
damage awards, they must meet stringent standing requirements including
showing that the conduct in question caused an injury-in-fact to the plaintiff’s
business or property, that the recovery is not duplicative of that of a more
directly injured person, that the injury is one that the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent, and that the damages claimed are a reasonable measure
of the injury. See, e.g., 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION 61–62 (3d ed. 2007).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006) (“Any person, firm, corporation, or
association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court
of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . .”); see also ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STATUTES at 651 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining that California’s Cartwright Act was amended in
1978 to allow indirect purchasers to bring claims under the Act).
71. See Blizzard et al., supra note 4, at 304. For example, California’s
Cartwright Act includes a damages provision which states that an action may
be brought under the Act “by any person who is injured in his or her business
or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this
chapter, regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly
with the defendant.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (West 2012). “Indirect
purchasers” are purchasers who did not buy the product or service directly
from one of the defendants in an antitrust action, but bought from a prior
purchaser of the product or service. Cf. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S.
93, 97 (1989) (“The State and the local governments were all indirect
purchasers of concrete block—that is, they did not purchase concrete block
directly from the price-fixing defendants but rather purchased products or
contracted for construction into which the concrete block was incorporated by
a prior purchaser.”).
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challenges, courts apply state law to the contested settlement
in concert with federal antitrust law.72
4. The Legality of Pay-for-Delay Settlements
The Federal Circuit Courts have taken different
approaches to the legality of pay-for-delay settlements. In the
In re Cardizem example outlined in Part I.A.2, the Sixth
Circuit found that the settlement agreement was “a classic
example of a per se illegal restraint on trade.”73 The court’s
conclusion derived from the anticompetitive nature of the
agreement to eliminate competition.74
Some courts have been more deferential to the
pharmaceutical companies, applying a rule of reason analysis.75
In Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.76 the
Eleventh Circuit refused to find the reverse payment
settlement per se illegal, concluding that “[u]nlike some kinds
of agreements that are per se illegal whether engaged in by
patentees or anyone else, such as tying or price-fixing, the
exclusion of infringing competition is the essence of the patent
grant.”77 The court further found that the fact that the patent
at issue was later determined to be invalid did not subject the
settlement agreement to per se treatment; the agreement
should be judged by its reasonableness at the time it was
formed.78

72. See Blizzard et al., supra note 4, at 323 (“State laws often contain
equivalent, or even broader claims than federal law, allowing indirect
purchasers to pursue the state law equivalents of Walker Process claims,
sham patent litigation claims, and sham citizen petitions claims.”). The
Supreme Court has ruled that state antitrust laws that allow indirect
purchasers to sue for damages are not preempted by federal antitrust law. See
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101.
73. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–08 (6th Cir.
2003).
74. Id. at 908; see also Carrier, supra note 6, at 2 (“The court found that
the brand paid ‘the only potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out
of the market.’” (quoting In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908
(6th Cir. 2003))).
75. See generally supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (describing
how patentees should be able to make agreements that do not exceed the scope
of their patent).
76. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.
2003).
77. Id. at 1306.
78. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit later announced what became known
as the “scope of the patent” test79 in Schering Plough Corp. v.
FTC,80 evaluating “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of
the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that
scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”81 Using
this test, the court applied a presumption of patent validity,82
and accordingly found no expansion beyond the scope of the
patent in the settlement agreement.83 In reference to Valley
Drug and Schering Plough, the Eleventh Circuit later “clarified
that its prior opinions did not call for an evaluation of the
strength of the patent but rather only a determination whether,
absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, the
settlement agreement exceeded the scope of the patent.”84 In
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elan Corp.,85 the Eleventh
Circuit applied its three-part test, finding that plaintiff Andrx
had sufficiently alleged a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act;86 if Andrx’s allegation that the defendant generic drug
company agreed never to market its product were true, then the
agreement would exceed the exclusionary scope of the patent.87
Taking the “scope of the patent” test one step further, the
Second Circuit has characterized the settlements as essentially
per se legal.88 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation89 did
not examine the validity of the patent, but drew the
presumption that as long as the patent litigation is not a sham
and the patentee has not exceeded the scope of the patent, the
settlement is legal.90 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
79. See Carrier, supra note 6, at 1.
80. Schering Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
81. Id. at 1066.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1075–76.
84. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 2012).
85. Andrx Pharm., Inc., v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005).
86. Id. at 1235.
87. Id.
88. See Carrier, supra note 6, at 3 (“Courts then imperceptibly shifted
from punishing conduct ‘outside the scope’ of the patent to immunizing
conduct ‘within the scope’ of the patent. In doing so, the test took a dramatic
turn toward deference.”).
89. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
90. See id. at 211–13. The Second Circuit made the following observation
regarding the possibility that a patent on a brand name drug, which was the
object of a contested settlement, was in fact invalid:
We are not unaware of a troubling dynamic that is at work in these
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Circuit (CAFC) affirmed the district court’s application of the
“scope of the patent” test in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litigation,91 concluding that “[t]he essence of the
inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition beyond
the exclusionary zone of the patent. This analysis has been
adopted by the Second and the Eleventh Circuits and by the
district court below and we find it to be completely consistent
with Supreme Court precedent.”92
The Third Circuit further complicated the circuit split in
July 2012 when it applied a “quick look rule of reason analysis”
in deciding In re K-Dur.93 The court enunciated the test as
follows:
[W]e will direct the District Court to apply a quick look rule of reason
analysis based on the economic realities of the reverse payment
settlement rather than the labels applied by the settling parties.
Specifically, the finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent
holder to a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into
the market as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of
trade, which could be rebutted by showing that the payment (1) was
for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some procompetitive benefit.94

The court reasoned that:
[T]he judicial preference for settlement, while generally laudable,
should not displace countervailing public policy objectives or, in this
case, Congress’s determination—which is evident from the structure
of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the statements in the legislative
record—that litigated patent challenges are necessary to protect
consumers from unjustified monopolies by name brand drug
manufacturers.95

cases. The less sound the patent or the less clear the infringement,
and therefore the less justified the monopoly enjoyed by the patent
holder, the more a rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the
patent holder by allowing it to retain the patent. But the law allows
the settlement even of suits involving weak patents with the
presumption that the patent is valid and that settlement is merely an
extension of the valid patent monopoly. So long as the law encourages
settlement, weak patent cases will likely be settled even though such
settlements will inevitably protect patent monopolies that are,
perhaps, undeserved.
Id. at 211.
91. In re Ciproflaxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); see id. at 1333. CAFC was created primarily to interpret patent law
and stand as a specialized court for national unity of patent regulation. See
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 14, at 10.
92. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1336.
93. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 196, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 217.

MARSILI_PROOF(DO NOT DELETE)

864

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/12/2013 12:02 PM

[Vol. 14:2

Finally, in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,96 the
Eleventh Circuit stuck to its precedent, stating, “Our Valley
Drug, Schering-Plough, and Andrx decisions establish the rule
that, absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a
reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so
long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent.”97 This series of cases
illustrates the uncertainty and inconsistency of pay-for-delay
challenge jurisprudence, though the courts have generally
embraced a more deferential approach in recent years.
B. FEDERAL PATENT LAW PREEMPTION
1. Federal Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
which declares that the “Laws of the United States” are “the
Supreme Law of the Land,” provides the basis for the doctrine
of preemption.98 Preemption stands for the idea that, “under

96. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 787 (2012).
97. Id. at 1312 (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit gave a pointed
rejection of the FTC’s argument to “adopt ‘a rule that an exclusion payment is
unlawful if, viewing the situation objectively as of the time of the settlement,
it is more likely than not that the patent would not have blocked generic entry
earlier than the agreed-upon entry date.’” Id. By analyzing the defendants’
probability-based anticipation of success,
[p]atent litigation can also be a high stakes, spin-the-chambers, all or
nothing undertaking. For the company with a patented drug, it
obviously makes sense to settle the infringement action if it is “not
likely to prevail,” even though that company may have a substantial
(up to 49%) chance of winning. On the other side of the settlement
equation is the generic drug company that is only “likely to prevail” in
the action; with a substantial (up to 49%) chance of losing, that
company also has a legitimate motive for settling. When both sides of
a dispute have a substantial chance of winning and losing, especially
when their chances may be 49% to 51%, it is reasonable for them to
settle. That companies with conflicting claims settle drug patent
litigation in these circumstances is not a violation of the antitrust
laws.
Id. at 1313 (citations omitted).
98. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the . . . Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”); Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve,
Introduction: Preemption in Context, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’
POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 1, 3 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve
eds., 2007).
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the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, federal law reigns
supreme and hence preempts any conflicting law or law that
federal legislation deems preempted.”99 The doctrine may be
understood as encompassing three basic types of preemption:
express, field, and conflict or obstacle.100
Express preemption exists where Congress has included a
provision in legislation stipulating that states may not exercise
a given power.101 The Patent Act does not contain an express
preemption provision,102 unlike other areas of intellectual
property (IP) law.103
Field preemption refers to an implicit intent of Congress
that federal regulation has completely occupied an area of law,
such that state regulation of the same area is impermissible.104
Though the history and current status of the doctrine has been
convoluted,105 perhaps the clearest statement of the doctrine

99. William W. Buzbee, Introduction, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE
THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 1 (William W.
Buzbee ed., 2008).
100. See, e.g., Ralph F. Hall & Michelle Mercer, Rethinking Lohr: Does
“SE” Mean Safe and Effective, Substantially Equivalent, or Both?, 13 MINN. J.
L. SCI. & TECH. 737, 755 (2012); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225,
226 (2000). Preemption may be divided into taxonomies different than the one
given above. See Epstein & Greve, supra note 98, at 18; KENNETH STARR ET
AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE APPELLATE JUDGES
CONFERENCE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 14–34 (1991).
101. See Nelson, supra note 100, at 227.
102. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[F]ederal patent law plainly does not provide for explicit
preemption . . . .”); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 5-41.
103. The Copyright Act does include an express preemption provision, 17
U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 5-43. The provision
states that “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any
State.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). For an analysis of conflicting interpretations
of this statute, see Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the
Right of Publicity with First Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis,
33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165, 181–88 (2010).
104. See Nelson, supra note 100, at 227. Both field preemption and conflict
preemption can be considered to fall under a broader category of “implied”
preemption, where, in the absence of an explicit provision in a statute,
Congress’s intent that federal law displaces state law is implied. Cf. STARR ET
AL., supra note 100, at 18–30 (classifying “occupation of the field” and
“obstacle preemption” as types of “implied preemption”).
105. Cf. Young, supra note 12, at 255 (“Most observers consider the law in
this area to be, in the words of a leading practitioner, ‘a muddle.’”).
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came from the 1947 case, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator.106 In Rice,
Justice Douglas suggested state law is preempted where
federal law is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or it
may “touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”107 Field
preemption may also be described as “jurisdictional”
preemption, the idea that jurisdictional rules exist that prohibit
states from regulating certain fields.108
Finally, conflict preemption arises when the state law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”109 Justice
Douglas classified conflict preemption as two separate
categories: obstacle preemption, where “the object sought to be
obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose,” and conflict
preemption, where “the state policy may produce a result
inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.”110 One
scholar characterizes the test courts should apply as follows:
“Courts are required to disregard state law if, but only if, it
contradicts a rule validly established by federal law.”111
The Supreme Court has frustrated courts and scholars
through its inconsistent application and interpretation of the
preemption doctrine.112 Further, the Court has decided only a
handful of decisions regarding preemption of federal patent
law.113 These decisions provide the only Supreme Court
106. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
107. Id. at 230.
108. Nelson, supra note 100, at 261–62.
109. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). An alternative taxonomy
of federal preemption comprises express preemption and implied preemption,
wherein implied preemption includes jurisdictional, or field preemption, and
obstacle preemption. See, e.g., John E. Mauk, Note, The Slippery Slope of
Secrecy: Why Patent Law Preempts Reverse-Engineering Clauses in ShrinkWrap Licenses, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 819, 830–31 (2001); supra note 104.
110. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
111. Nelson, supra note 100, at 260. Nelson refers to this as the “logicalcontradiction” test. Id.
112. Cf. id. at 262; Young, supra note 12, at 255.
113. See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicorn Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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guidance on the preemptive effect of patent law, which are
outlined in Part I.B.2 below, along with relevant case law from
the CAFC. Though these decisions concern whether patent law
preempts various state laws, it is important to note that the
Court has not considered whether federal patent law preempts
state antitrust law. CAFC had the opportunity in Zenith
Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc. to decide if federal antitrust law
may be “preempted” by federal patent laws.114 There is a basic
argument that “a given federal antitrust challenge to the
exercise of federally-created intellectual property rights cannot
be countenanced because the antitrust challenge conflicts with,
and should be deemed ‘preempted’ by, the intellectual property
rights regime.”115 Yet CAFC declined to find any preemption
among federal intellectual property and antitrust law, instead
finding that when two federal laws conflict, a court must
“interpret and apply them ‘in a way that preserves the
purposes of both and fosters harmony between them.’”116
2. Supreme Court and CAFC Case Law Addressing Preemption
of Federal Patent Law
The Supreme Court has decided a few cases which address
the question of preemption of federal patent law over various
state laws.117 In an early pair of cases, the Court found that
state competition laws are preempted when they attempt to
create patent-like rights for products in the public domain.118
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,119 the Court held that
state unfair competition law could not impose liability for
copying of the design of a lamp that was not protected by
federal patent law.120 The Court reasoned that a state could not
evade the requirements of federal patent law by using unfair
competition law to provide protection to an unpatented

114. See Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 5-48.
115. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 5-48.
116. Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1347 (quoting Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995)).
117. See BARTON BEEBE ET AL., TRADEMARK, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND
BUSINESS TORTS 805–17 (2011).
118. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 225 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 234 (1964); see infra notes
119–123 and accompanying text.
119. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
120. Id. at 232–33.
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product.121 In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,122 the
Court held that though state laws may not prohibit copying and
selling of unpatented products, states may enforce laws that
require proper identification of the source of the copied
products.123
After Sears and Compco, the Court decided a case
involving preemption of federal copyright law, Goldstein v.
California, and found that a state statute criminalizing piracy
of sound recordings (which was not a protected work under the
Copyright Act at that time) was not preempted by federal
copyright law.124 The Court reasoned that, whereas in Sears
and Compco the state laws were “to prevent the copying of
articles which did not meet the requirements for federal
protection,” a similar conflict didn’t exist in this case because
“[i]n regard to this category of ‘Writings,’ Congress has drawn
no balance; rather, it has left the area unattended, and no
reason exists why the State should not be free to act.”125
The Court again deferred to state law in a case involving a
claim of preemption of state trade secret law. In Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp.,126 the Court found that state trade secret
laws are not preempted by federal patent law,127 reasoning that
the important question in determining federal patent
preemption is whether the state law in question conflicts with
the operation of the Patent Act.128 Significantly, the Court
announced a test for determining whether a given state law
conflicts with the purposes of federal patent law:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and
to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires;
third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure

121. Id. at 231–32 (“To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition
to prevent the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to
be patented would be to permit the State to block off from the public
something which federal law has said belongs to the public.”).
122. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
123. Id. at 238.
124. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (“We conclude that
the State of California has exercised a power which it retained under the
Constitution, and that the challenged statute, as applied in this case, does not
intrude into an area which Congress has, up to now, pre-empted.”).
125. Id. at 569–70.
126. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
127. Id. at 491–92.
128. Id. at 479.
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that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the
public.129

The Court noted that trade secret law protects items which
would not be proper subjects for consideration for patent
protection,130 that having two systems that both support
innovation will not be in conflict,131 and that in cases where a
product is patentable, it is unlikely that an inventor would opt
for the lesser protections provided by trade secret laws just to
avoid disclosure.132
Finally, in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Draft Boats,
Inc.,133 the Court held that a state law may not restrict the
public’s ability to exploit an unpatented design,134 and that the
state had, in effect, created a monopoly, which encroached on
Congress’s power to regulate patent law.135 In finding the state
law to be preempted,136 the court distinguished Kewanee Oil
based on the differences in protection offered by trade secret
law, versus the “patent like” rights awarded by the state law in
Bonito Boats.137
In the late nineties, the CAFC decided a series of cases
regarding federal patent preemption of state business tort and
unfair competition claims.138 In Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon
Corp., the CAFC held that a state unfair competition claim
alleging intentional interference with contractual relations,
based on a patentee’s inequitable conduct before the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),139 was not
preempted by federal patent law.140 The court reasoned that
129. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)
(interpreting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)).
130. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 482.
131. Id. at 484.
132. Id. at 490.
133. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Draft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
134. Id. at 168.
135. Id. at 167 (“The Florida law substantially restricts the public’s ability
to exploit an unpatented design in general circulation, raising the specter of
state-created monopolies in a host of useful shapes and processes for which
patent protection has been denied or is otherwise unobtainable.”).
136. Id. at 168.
137. Id. at 156–57 (“[S]tates may not offer patent-like protection to
intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter
of federal law.”).
138. Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Hunter
Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc,. 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
139. Dow Chemical, 139 F.3d at 1472.
140. Id. at 1479.
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the state law wasn’t preempted because it “does not stand as an
impermissible obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the patent laws and because the cause of action requires
entirely different elements from the defense of inequitable
conduct under the federal patent laws.”141
However, the CAFC reached a different conclusion in
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design when it held that
state commercial disparagement claims are preempted by
federal patent law in cases where the state law claim depends
on the patent holder’s conduct before the PTO and the plaintiff
fails to allege fraud or bad faith in obtaining the patent.142
Since federal patent law already addresses these issues, CAFC
reasoned, a showing of bad faith is required in order to avoid
preemption.143
As mentioned in Part I.B.1, supra, the CAFC declined to
acknowledge a formal preemption between conflicting federal
laws in Zenith Electronics, finding that neither federal
antitrust law nor federal patent law preempted a federal unfair
competition claim.144
The Supreme Court’s and the CAFC’s rulings regarding
preemption of federal patent law, though not expansive, are
instructive and provide guidance as to how courts might apply
the doctrine of preemption to cases where pay-for-delay
settlements are challenged in state courts under state antitrust
laws. One such case is pending hearing in the Supreme Court
of California, and invites the application of preemption
analysis.145
3. Case Study: In re Cipro Cases I & II
In February 2012, the California Supreme Court granted
review for In re Cipro Cases I & II (the Cipro Cases).146 This is
presently the first and only challenge to a pay-for-delay
141. Id. at 1478–79.
142. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1336.
143. Id. The CAFC distinguished Dow, suggesting that it “is in harmony
with this conduct-based approach. In that case, because the plaintiff alleged
the bad faith enforcement of a patent, the state law torts were not preempted.”
Id. at 1337 (citations omitted).
144. Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1351–55 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
145. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted,
269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012).
146. Yeung, supra note 11.
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settlement brought in a state court.147 One of the issues to be
presented upon review is whether “the facts of this case
demonstrating egregious patent misuse in the form of a large
cash payment, made to head off likely invalidation, that drove
up prescription drug prices in an area critical to social welfare,
preclude federal preemption of California law . . . .”148 Thus, the
California Supreme Court may directly decide this issue.
The court will be reviewing the decision of the California
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District.149 The case, like payfor-delay challenges brought in federal courts, involves a
pioneering company, Bayer, which concluded settlement
agreements with several generic companies stipulating that the
generics would delay entry to the market, and requiring
payments to one of the generics, Barr, amounting to nearly
$400 million.150 Bayer’s patent for the ciprofloxacin
hydrochloride molecule, the active ingredient in Cipro,151 was
confirmed to be valid upon reexamination152 and in further
ANDA challenges subsequent to the initial settlements.153
Direct and indirect purchasers initiated federal litigation
challenging the settlements in 2000 and 2001; all the litigation
ultimately favored the pharmaceutical companies, finding that
the agreements were within the exclusionary scope of the

147. Id.
148. Petition for Review at 1, In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th
442 (Dec. 18, 2011) (No. S198616). The petitioner argues that the California
Court of Appeal wrongly decided that federal patent law preempts California
antitrust law and that this ruling will completely prevent state courts from
hearing patent disputes. Id. at 20.
149. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted,
269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012).
150. Id. at 451.
151. Cipro is “an antibiotic prescribed for the treatment of infections.” Id.
at 448.
152. Reexamination is a process which Congress implemented in 1980,
which was meant to improve the quality of patents by allowing the validity of
patents to be revisited by the PTO without recourse to litigation. See MERGES
& DUFFY, supra note 14, at 1099. The process was codified in the Patent Act
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–07 (ex parte reexamination) and 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18
(inter partes reexamination, added in 1999). Id. However, the reexamination
process was revised in the America Invents Act, and now comprises new postgrant and inter partes review proceedings and ex parte reexamination. See
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011);
Matthew C. Phillips & Kevin B. Laurence, Changes to Reexamination Under
the America Invents Act, INTELLECTUAL PROP. TODAY, Nov. 2011, at 22, 22–
23.
153. Cipro Cases, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 451–52.
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patent and therefore were not in violation of antitrust laws.154
The plaintiffs in this case, state residents and nonprofit
organizations, claimed that the settlements were per se illegal
under the Cartwright Act as an unreasonable restraint on
trade.155 The court analyzed the reasoning of federal challenges
to pay-for-delay settlements, and concluded that “unless a
patent was procured by fraud, or a suit for its enforcement was
objectively baseless, a settlement of the enforcement suit does
not violate the Cartwright Act if the settlement restrains
competition only within the scope of the patent.”156
The court further employed the doctrine of preemption to
analyze plaintiffs’ sham litigation claim.157 The plaintiffs
argued that Bayer procured its patent through inequitable
conduct, and that Bayer’s infringement suit was therefore
objectively baseless.158 The California Court of Appeal
concluded that the plaintiffs’ sham litigation claim was
preempted by federal patent law, based on a theory of field (or
“jurisdictional”) preemption; the court reasoned that federal
courts have original jurisdiction when “the plaintiff’s right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary
element of one of the well-pleaded claims.”159 The California
Court of Appeals also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that a state
court may decide patent issues that are ancillary to the main
154. Id. at 452–54.
155. Id. at 456.
156. Id. at 467.
157. A sham litigation claim requires a plaintiff to show “(1) ‘the lawsuit
[to] be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits,’ and (2) that the litigant’s ‘subjective
motivation’ for bringing the action was a sham seeking to conceal a knowing
attempt to interfere with a competitor.” Id. at 470 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 547 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). The
court looked only at jurisdictional, or field preemption, but the parties
addressed the possibility of preemption in their briefs, which is reviewed in
detail in Part II, infra. The court declined to address substantive or “conflict”
preemption in its opinion. Id. at 470–77.
158. See id. at 470. “Objectively baseless” refers to sham litigation,
described in note 157, supra.
159. See id. at 473 (quoting Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 118 Cal.
App. 4th 1413, 1422 (2004)). The Court of Appeal specifically reasoned that,
because plaintiffs’ claim of an objectively baseless suit depended on a question
of federal patent law (the question of whether Bayer procured its patent
through inequitable conduct), the claim was preempted by patent law. See id.
at 473.
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claim, finding that plaintiffs’ claims in fact depended on an
issue of patent law.160
The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the
plaintiffs’ sham litigation claim “arises from and is preempted
by federal law,”161 invited discussion of preemption in the
parties’ petitions for review and briefs that followed the
opinion.162 Though the Court of Appeal only explicitly
addressed field preemption, briefs filed with the Supreme
Court of California address substantive preemption (or
“obstacle preemption”), as discussed in detail in Part II.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION APPLIED TO STATE
ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO PAY-FOR-DELAY
SETTLEMENTS
A. PREEMPTION IN CONTEXT: IN RE CIPRO I & II
Part I of this Note explored the mechanics of pay-for-delay
settlements and their legal treatment to date, as well as the
doctrine of preemption as it has been understood by the
Supreme Court and scholars. This Part analyzes the
applicability of the doctrine of preemption to a state law
challenge to a pay-for-delay settlement, using the Cipro Cases
as an illustration. That analysis is informed by a general
framework adapted from the limited case law in this area.163
Finally, Part II.B, infra, explores policy ramifications of finding
state antitrust law to be preempted by federal patent law,
concluding that preemption is inappropriate in this context.
1. The Doctrine of Preemption
As described in Part I.B, supra, the doctrine of preemption
may be divided into three types: express, field, and conflict or
obstacle.164 The Supreme Court’s pronouncements on
preemption have tended to lack clarity, and have left room for
lower and state courts to interpret the doctrine divergently.165

160. See id. at 475.
161. Id. at 477.
162. See, e.g., Petition for Review, supra note 148, at 19.
163. See supra Part I.B.2.
164. Again, different taxonomies exist to describe the types of preemption;
for the purposes of this analysis, the terms “substantive” and “jurisdictional”
may also be employed to refer to conflict/obstacle and field preemption,
respectively.
165. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Regarding the Cipro Cases, field and conflict preemption are
relevant; as noted in Part II.B, infra, there is no provision in
the Patent Act requiring preemption, and express preemption
does not apply.166 However, the text of the relevant patent laws
and of the state laws at issue in the Cipro Cases will provide a
framework for the preemption analysis.
The plaintiffs in the Cipro Cases brought claims under
section 16720 of the Cartwright Act, California’s antitrust act,
alleging that “Defendants, and their co-conspirators, entered
into and engaged in a continuing unlawful trust in restraint of
the trade and commerce described above in violation of
California Business and Professions Code section 16720.”167
The Cartwright Act defines a “trust” as: “a combination of
capital, skill or acts by two or more persons for any of the
following purposes: . . . [t]o create or carry out restrictions in
trade
or
commerce . . . [t]o
prevent
competition
in
manufacturing . . . sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or
any commodity.”168 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated
166. “[F]ederal patent law plainly does not provide for explicit
preemption . . . .” Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d
1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
167. Consolidated Second Amended Complaint at 35, In re Cipro Cases I &
II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012) (Nos.
4154, 4220). The plaintiffs also brought claims for violation of state unfair
competition law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2012), and common
law monopolization, but this analysis will focus only on the antitrust
challenges.
168. The full text of section 16720 reads as follows:
A trust is a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more
persons for any of the following purposes:
(a) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
(b) To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of
merchandise or of any commodity.
(c) To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation,
sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity.
(d) To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or
consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any
article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended
for sale, barter, use or consumption in this State.
(e) To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts,
obligations, or agreements of any kind or description, by which they
do all or any or any combination of the following:
(1) Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any article or
any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or
consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
(2) Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity
or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.

MARSILI_PROOF(DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

7/12/2013 12:02 PM

STATE CHALLENGES TO PAY-FOR-DELAY

875

section 16720 through
trusts [that] have included concerted action and undertakings among
the Defendants with the purpose and effect of: (a) allocating the
entire California market for ciprofloxacin to Bayer; (b) permitting
Bayer to maintain a monopoly over the California market for
ciprofloxacin and to charge supra-competitive prices for Cipro, the
proceeds of which it shares in part with Barr and HMR; (c) precluding
the introduction of generic ciprofloxacin in California, which would
have been available to consumers at a cost much lower than Cipro;
and (d) fixing, raising, maintaining or stabilizing the price of
ciprofloxacin.169

The patent laws themselves are not explicit regarding the
extent of rights that they bestow. But several provisions seem
relevant to the “scope of the patent” referred to in federal
circuit court decisions.170 The Patent Act grants patent holders
a negative property right to “exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United
States.”171 The patent holder is entitled to a twenty-year term,
subject to adjustments (including those granted under the
Hatch-Waxman Act mentioned in Part I.A),172 and the patent is
entitled to a presumption of validity.173 As noted in Kewanee
Oil, there is nothing explicit in the text of these laws indicating

(3) Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or
transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly
or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among
themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or
transportation of any such article or commodity.
(4) Agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests
that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any
such article or commodity, that its price might in any manner be
affected.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 2012).
169. Consolidated Second Amended Complaint, supra note 167, at 37.
170. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 224
(2d Cir. 2006); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp.
2d 514, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d in part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
171. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
172. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
173. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006). The full text of the section reads as follows:
A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be
presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims;
dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even
though dependent upon an invalid claim. The burden of establishing
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party
asserting such invalidity.
Id.
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preemption.174 The question, then, turns to Congress’ purpose
for enacting the Patent Act, whether it can be implied that the
Patent Act was meant to foreclose the states’ ability to
adjudicate matters touching on the patent law, and whether
the Cartwright Act conflicts with the purposes and objectives of
the Patent Act. Since the taxonomy of preemption is often
neither clear nor consistent, analysis of “field” and “conflict”
preemption may overlap, as the ultimate inquiry relates to
congressional intent.175
2. Field Preemption
The doctrine of field preemption and Supreme Court
jurisprudence suggest that state courts are competent to
adjudicate antitrust challenges to pay-for-delay settlements,
and that state antitrust claims are not preempted by the
federal patent laws. As mentioned in Part I.B.1, supra, field
preemption exists where state law “regulates conduct in a field
that Congress intends the federal government to occupy
exclusively.”176 In the Cipro Cases, the California Court of
Appeal reached the issue of preemption, but focused its
analysis narrowly on jurisdiction, failing to address
congressional intent.177 As an amicus request for review of the
Cipro Cases points out, the Court of Appeal used a rule for
determining exclusive federal jurisdiction rather than applying
the doctrine of field preemption when it determined that
plaintiffs’ claims depended on a question of patent law and
therefore were preempted.178 Questions of jurisdiction may

174. Cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1947) (“The
patent law does not explicitly endorse or forbid the operation of trade secret
law.”).
175. Nelson, supra note 100, at 263 (“The [Supreme] Court itself
has . . . conceded that field pre-emption may be understood as a species of
conflict pre-emption.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
176. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
177. See supra text accompanying note 159.
178. See Amicus Curiae Petition for Review at 8, In re Cipro Cases I & II,
200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012) (No.
S198616). The California Court of Appeal used 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), a
jurisdictional rule requiring exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction for
cases where “the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of
a substantial question of federal patent law,” and cited Hunter Douglas as
supporting this assertion. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442, 473
(2011). However, the CAFC’s determination of the jurisdiction issue was
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evidence a congressional intent that certain matters of federal
law ought not be determined in state court, but that conclusion
merely indicates that state court is the improper venue to try
the question.179 The preemption inquiry asks whether Congress
has the constitutional power to occupy a particular field
entirely, such that a state law cannot stand.180 Proper
jurisdiction is a threshold matter to adjudicating state law
claims that relate to issues of patent law that are brought in
state court,181 so it merits discussion.
As mentioned in Part II.A.1, supra, even though a
jurisdiction question is not an identical inquiry to field
preemption, there could be overlap in Congress’s intent that
certain federal questions are not to be adjudicated in state
court.182 With that in mind, the court in the Cipro Cases could
have considered case law that indicates an expansive right of
the state to adjudicate issues concerning patent law.183 The
Supreme Court has made it clear that state courts are

separate from its preemption analysis, and did not involve an inquiry into
Congress’s intent regarding the reach of federal patent law. Hunter Douglas,
153 F.3d at 1324–25. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York similarly applied 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) to find a state Walker Process claim
preempted by federal patent law. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The court
referenced the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “what it means for a claim to
‘arise under’ patent law,” id. (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809–11 (1988)), and concluded that the claims arose
under patent law since they required a showing of misconduct before the PTO.
Id. This argument fails for the same reason the Cipro Cases court’s argument
fails, as discussed below.
179. Cf. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1062 (2013) (stating that “[t]he
question presented is whether a state law claim alleging legal malpractice in
the handling of a patent case must be brought in federal court[,]” and
concluding that the state law malpractice claim did not arise under federal
patent law for purposes of § 1338(a)); id. at 1068.
180. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
181. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (“No State court shall have jurisdiction
over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents . . . .”).
182. Cf. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1329–30 (concluding that a state law
claim whose outcome turned on the validity and enforceability of a patent
raised issues of federal patent law that were sufficiently “substantial” to
confer federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)).
183. Cf. id. at 1334 (determining the possibility of field preemption of state
unfair competition claims by federal patent law, and finding that precedent
showed “the substantial difference between the two fields” and demonstrated
“that the regulation of business affairs is traditionally a matter for state
regulation”).

MARSILI_PROOF(DO NOT DELETE)

878

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/12/2013 12:02 PM

[Vol. 14:2

competent to decide patent law issues, though the state court
may not invalidate the issued patent.184
Perhaps cementing the argument that state courts have
jurisdiction to hear antitrust claims that involve issues of
patent law, the Supreme Court’s February 2013 opinion in
Gunn v. Minton held that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) “does not deprive
the state courts of subject matter jurisdiction” in cases where
the court must answer a question of federal patent law to
resolve the state claim, but “their answer will have no broader
effects.”185 The Court adopted the Grable test for determining
when claims “arise under” federal patent law and must be
brought in federal court: “federal jurisdiction over a state law
claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2)
actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution
in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance
approved by Congress.”186 The Court focused its inquiry on the
third factor and concluded that, though resolution of a patent
issue in assessing a state claim may matter to the specific
parties involved, “something more, demonstrating that the
question is significant to the federal system as a whole, is
needed” to preclude state jurisdiction.187 In light of this
decision, state courts have wide authority to hear state claims
that depend on resolution of a patent issue—even a
“substantial” issue like whether plaintiff Minton’s infringement
claim would have prevailed188—where such resolution lacks
importance to the federal system as a whole.
Beyond the question of jurisdiction, further considerations
could have informed the California Court of Appeal’s field
preemption determination, and may inform state antitrust
challenges to pay-for-delay settlements generally. First, the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. United States
implies that the doctrine of field preemption may be inapposite
where the potentially conflicting state and federal law regulate

184. The Supreme Court has said that “state courts can and regularly do
adjudicate state claims raising patent law questions.” Reply Brief on the
Merits at 46, In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev.
granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012) (No. S198616). But state courts do not have
jurisdiction if there is “a substantial question of federal patent law.” Id. at 51.
185. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013).
186. Id. at 1065.
187. Id. at 1068.
188. See id.
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different fields.189 The Court found that “the Federal
Government has occupied the field of alien registration” and
held that “[w]here Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in
the field of alien registration, even complementary state
regulation is impermissible. Field preemption reflects a
congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the
area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.”190 In the case of
pay-for-delay, the area of state regulation is antitrust, a field
which Congress does not occupy exclusively. In California v.
ARC America Corp., the Supreme Court held that, in the
antitrust field, state law will not be preempted by concurrent
federal antitrust law.191 Further, the Supreme Court has
evaluated the extent of similarity between the Cartwright Act
and the Sherman Act, and concluded that the Cartwright Act
was not, in fact, modeled after the Sherman Act, nor after
common law, so Sherman Act cases are not dispositive in
interpreting the Cartwright Act.192 This holding is echoed in
the reasoning of another court filing for the impending
Supreme Court of California hearing, which submits that
defendants depended on federal decisions that interpreted the
Sherman Act, but that they failed to explain how limitations on
the Sherman Act would preempt the Cartwright Act.193 This
illustrates the key point that, though federal antitrust and
patent laws are formally considered to co-exist, state antitrust
laws predated their federal counterparts, and may create a

189. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012).
190. Id. The Court further defined the premise of field preemption as the
idea “that States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal
Government has reserved for itself.” Id.
191. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that California’s indirect
purchaser remedy is not preempted by the Sherman Act, and that “Congress
intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust
remedies.” California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989).
192. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 70, at 6-4. California
law has notable differences from Sherman Act cases in the analytical rules it
applies; for example, the state does recognize a set of practices as per se
restraints on trade, but its rule of reason differs from federal law in that it
sparsely applies the “quick look” approach. See id. at 6-9 to 6-10. Further, case
law has shown that certain provisions of the Cartwright Act may stand where
they prohibit something that is permitted by the Sherman Act, and the
Cartwright Act is not preempted by the Sherman Act in such cases. See id. at
6-32 (citing Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA Transp., 219 Cal. App. 3d 811
(1990)).
193. See Reply to Answers to Petition for Review at 13, In re Cipro Cases I
& II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012) (No.
S198616).
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more palpable conflict with federal patent law.194 This
consideration is applicable in determining the extent to which
state antitrust laws conflict with federal patent law,195
discussed in Part II.A.3, infra, as they may not be substantively
the same as federal antitrust law.
Next, should a state court adopt the California Court of
Appeal’s approach by adopting the “scope of the patent” test
and following its approach to “preemption,” and if a court could
apply that approach to the question of federal jurisdiction, a
plaintiff’s claim would always be preempted. In the Cipro
Cases, the court concluded that plaintiffs’ sham litigation claim
required a determination of a substantial question of patent
law and therefore could not be adjudicated in state court.196 In
its rejection of plaintiffs’ argument that their claims were
premised on the defendant’s conduct in the settlement
agreement and not in the procurement of the patent itself,197
the court’s reasoning is somewhat circular. It first determined

194. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 70, at 6-1 (“The
California antitrust laws provide a potent alternative to their federal
counterparts. They often have been accorded broader interpretation by the
courts . . . .”).
195. As mentioned in Part I.B.1, supra, the categories of preemption often
blur and overlap. In addressing the government’s argument of field
preemption in Hines v. Davidowitz, Justice Black wrote:
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often
repeated formula that Congress “by occupying the field” has excluded
from it all state legislation. Every Act of Congress occupies some field,
but we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that
it has precluded a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it
by the Constitution. To discover the boundaries we look to the federal
statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its
legislative history.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78–79 (1941). The analysis then turned to
(traditional) conflict preemption. See id. at 79–81. The Court concluded that
“compliance with the state law does not preclude or even interfere with
compliance with the act of Congress.” Id. at 81.
196. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442, 473 (2011), rev.
granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012).
197. Note that even under the district court’s approach in In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, this argument may still have
teeth, as the allegations focus on conduct in settling a patent dispute, not
conduct in procurement of the patent. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Under Minton, this
claim should not be precluded from state court; even if the claim required the
court to pass on the question of patent validity, like in Minton, a state court’s
resolution of a claim involving such a question would not affect the validity of
the patent. See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013).
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that the “scope of the patent test” is the correct test to apply
and that the defendants could only be subject to liability if
plaintiffs could prove sham litigation, and then concluded that
the plaintiffs were foreclosed from proving sham litigation
because such inquiry would require answering substantial
questions of patent law that cannot be decided in state
courts.198 Thus, the court has used an incorrect interpretation
of § 1338(a) to prevent a state claim from prevailing under its
own test for legality of pay-for-delay settlements.
Further, the California Court of Appeal did not address the
presumption against preemption applied by the Supreme Court
and adopted by California.199 Though the Court’s application of
the doctrine of preemption has not been incredibly consistent in
recent years, and it is unclear whether the Court considers Rice
good law, the Court continues to apply the presumption in some
cases.200 For example, in a 2008 decision, the majority opinion
favorably reiterated Rice, stating that “[w]hen addressing
questions of express or implied pre-emption, we begin our
analysis ‘with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”201 The
basis of the presumption against preemption in preserving
“historic police powers” of states is consistent with the above
discussion of the reach of state antitrust laws.
Thus, a field preemption approach to state antitrust law
challenges to pay-for-delay settlements should take account of
the jurisdiction question as a threshold issue (when pay-fordelay settlements are challenged in state court), though Minton
strongly suggests that state court jurisdiction is permitted.
Arizona suggests field preemption may be irrelevant when the
state law is not acting collaterally to federal law, while
California v. ARC America Corp. teaches that the Sherman Act
does not preempt the field of antitrust law. In further
consideration of the presumption against preemption and state
police powers, it is not clear that Congress intended the federal
198. Cf. Cipro Cases, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 473–74 (discussing how the
plaintiff’s claim under state law depended on proving sham litigation, but the
sham litigation claim was preempted).
199. See Petition for Review, supra note 148, at 22.
200. See Young, supra note 12, at 309; see also Nelson, supra note 100, at
262 (discussing how the Supreme Court has not treated the categories of
preemption separately).
201. Altria Group Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (alteration in
original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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patent law to so dominate the field that there is neither room
for the states to decide cases that involve the patent law, nor
room for states to supplement it.202
3. Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption inquiry requires a determination of
whether the relevant state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress,”203 and “[t]he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone” in determining preemption.204 In
determining whether California law is preempted by federal
patent law, it is first necessary to identify the potential area of
conflict, beginning with the language of the statutes
themselves.
The primary purpose of the Patent Act, generally stated, is
to provide inventors with an incentive to innovate and an
incentive to invest in innovation, by granting a temporary
monopoly on the specific invention of the patentee.205 The
Patent Act is founded upon the “IP Clause” of the Constitution,
which gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”206
With this basic premise in place, the question of conflict
preemption turns on whether laws that challenge pay-for-delay
settlements conflict with Congress’s objectives for the patent
laws.207
The Supreme Court has provided guidance on the question,
though not in the context of pay-for-delay settlements. As
illustrated in Part I.B.2, supra, the Supreme Court’s patent
(and copyright) preemption cases all involved state laws that
attempted to provide protection for Intellectual Property (IP).208
202. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
203. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
204. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n. v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
205. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974); see
also R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS, at 1-79 (4th ed. 2012)
(suggesting that the “increased incentive to invent that the expectation of
patenting creates” is the primary benefit of the patent system).
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
207. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 479 (“The only limitation on the States is
that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights they do not conflict with
the operation of the laws in this area passed by Congress . . . .”).
208. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 145
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In the cases where the court found preemption, the state law
was protecting conduct that created monopolies in
manufacture, use, or sale of IP—conduct that is regulated by
the Patent Act but which, in these cases, failed to meet the
requirements of the Patent Act. Where the Court found state
laws could stand, the laws were offering protection for IP that
was alternative or collateral to federal law.209 In contrast,
antitrust laws protect competition and consumer welfare by
regulating monopoly power, with the exception of legal
monopolies that are provided by IP law.210 Though the Supreme
Court’s preemption cases provide an imperfect analogy, the
Court’s reasoning should extend to substantive conflict with
federal patent law generally.211
In Kewanee Oil, the Court identified three purposes of the
patent law that must be considered in determining whether the
state law “clashes with the objectives of the federal patent
laws”:212 creating an incentive for inventors, ensuring that the
invention is disclosed to the public, and ensuring that
inventions that enter the public domain cannot leave the public
domain.213 The Court in Bonito Boats refined this test,
determining that a state law is preempted if it “substantially
interferes with” or “substantially impedes” one of the Kewanee
Oil objectives of federal patent law.214 Under this test, the
Cipro Cases’ plaintiffs’ claims under the Cartwright Act may be

(1989); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1964);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 225 (1964).
209. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 491–92; Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 571 (1973).
210. See supra Part I.A.3.
211. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318,
1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reasoning that, though the Supreme Court IP
preemption jurisprudence was not perfectly analogous, “it sets forth the
essential criteria” for analyzing preemption); cf. Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra
note 103, at 181 n.106 (discussing how the broader principle from Bonito Boats
should be “that state laws that substantially interfere with the federal patent
or copyright scheme are preempted”).
212. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964)).
213. See id. at 480–81.
214. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156–57
(1989). In this case the Court focused on the objective of ensuring that
inventions unworthy of federal patent protection remain in the public domain
for all to use. See id. at 156. For analysis of a “substantial interference”
standard applied in the context of preemption of state right of publicity law by
federal copyright law, see Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 103, at 181 n.106,
208–18.
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preempted by the federal patent law if the relevant provisions
of the Cartwright Act stand as an obstacle to one of the three
patent law objectives.
The second two purposes of the Kewanee Oil test are
clearer questions. As CAFC stated in Hunter Douglas, “[Patent
law] promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further
innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention
once the patent expires.”215 This policy objective is aligned with
the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act to expedite the entry of
generic versions of already-disclosed patented drugs to market
upon expiration of the patent.216 A state antitrust challenge to
a patent infringement settlement of a patented (and therefore
disclosed) drug could only promote this objective by attempting
to remedy the harms of delayed availability of generic drugs to
the market. The contested litigation itself, in which a generic
company has created a bioequivalent version of the patented
drug, suggests that the invention has been disclosed and has
sufficiently enabled one skilled in the art to recreate the
patented drug. Likewise, state law challenges to pay-for-delay
settlements create no conceivable threat of removing a
patented and publicly disclosed drug from the public domain—
these challenges would have the opposite purpose: preventing
the extension of the patent monopoly.
More complex is the question whether state antitrust
challenges to patent litigation settlements will affect the patent
law’s ability to incentivize pharmaceutical innovation. This
inquiry could be broken down into two issues: whether patent
protection really incentivizes invention of new drugs, and
whether challenges to patent litigation settlements have any
effect on the patent laws’ ability to incentivize invention of new
drugs.
Some scholars of patent reform argue that there is no proof
that patents incentivize invention.217 However, the
pharmaceutical industry has been considered to be an

215. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1333.
216. See supra Part I.A.1.
217. See Liza Vertinsky, An Organizational Approach to the Design of
Patent Law, 13 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 211, 224–25 (2012); Michele Boldrin
& David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Research Div., Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf.
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exceptional case.218 Pharmaceutical research is hugely
expensive and economically risky,219 requiring immense
investment, both public and private.220 Pharmaceutical
innovation is largely dependent on expected revenue, but the
extent to which the patent incentive causes innovation is
uncertain.221 On one hand, without the incentives of the patent
system, drug development may still take place, since much
drug development research is publicly subsidized because it is
in the public’s interest.222 Without patent law as an incentive,
new drugs may still be developed, but offered at a lower price to
consumers since the drug would not have the exclusionary
protection of a patent, yet could still be reverse engineered by
competitors.223 On the other hand, studies have shown that
patents do, in fact, play an important role in pharmaceutical
innovation.224 Additionally, the structure of pay-for-delay
settlements reveals the importance to drug companies of patent
protection; the payment avoids the risk of losing patent
protection through invalidation.225 Thus, it is uncertain
whether drug development would be chilled in the absence of
the patent laws.
Even assuming that patents incentivize new drug
development, it is unlikely that allowing challenges to pay-fordelay settlements would affect the patent laws’ ability to

218. See F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Reform in the
United States, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 184 (2009) (“[P]atents
are of special importance to pharmaceutical (and related biopharmaceutical)
companies, in part because they provide strong protection from competitive
imitation on products that often have relatively inelastic demands.”).
219. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2 (2006).
220. See id. at 27.
221. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D AND
THE EVOLVING MARKET FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1–2
(2009). The
introduction of new drugs has declined since 2000, id. at 2, while pay-for-delay
settlements have sharply increased in recent years. See supra notes 47–48 and
accompanying text. Though only a correlation, it appears the availability or
supposed legality of pay-for-delay settlements is not incentivizing
pharmaceutical innovation.
222. See generally Boldrin & Levine, supra note 217, at 4–5 (discussing the
role of patent law in the pharmaceutical industry).
223. See id.
224. See Scherer, supra note 218, at 173–76. In several surveys,
respondents from the pharmaceutical industry found patent protection to be
more important in curbing competition than respondents in other R&D fields.
See id.
225. See supra Part I.A.4.

MARSILI_PROOF(DO NOT DELETE)

886

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/12/2013 12:02 PM

[Vol. 14:2

incentivize new drug development. Some courts have
acknowledged the possibility that “exposing patent activity to
wider antitrust scrutiny would weaken the incentives
underlying the patent system, thereby depriving consumers of
beneficial products.”226 Commentators have also expressed
concern that antitrust liability in the context of pay-for-delay
may stifle innovation.227 However, whatever effect potential
antitrust liability for anticompetitive settlements has on
incentives to create new drugs, this effect should be viewed on
balance with the harmful effects of the settlements on
competition and innovation.228
Allowing state antitrust challenges to pay-for-delay
settlements potentially bears little connection to whether a
drug company will invent. As urged in a Reply Brief on the
Merits in the Cipro Cases, the belief that pay-for-delay
settlements will not be challenged will stifle real innovation by
“encouraging drug companies to place more reliance on the
least innovative patents.”229 In Dow Chemical, the CAFC,
applied the Kewanee Oil analysis to a state unfair competition
claim of contract interference by a patent holder.230 The CAFC
found that the state claims in no way interfered with the
objectives of the patent system identified in Kewanee Oil,
226. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186
(1st Cir. 1994); see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]ntitrust jurisprudence has well understood that the
enforcement of the antitrust laws is self-defeating if it chills or stifles
innovation.”).
227. See Sheila Kadura, Is an Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the
Appropriate Way to Prevent Anticompetitive Agreements Between Brandedand Generic-Pharmaceutical Companies?, 86 TEX. L. REV. 647, 664–65 (2008)
(“Clearly, generic products save consumers money, but it is important to
remember that such products cannot exist unless a branded-pharmaceutical
product is first developed and shown to be safe and effective, which is an
expensive endeavor. The decreased certainty that accompanies increased
litigation may be particularly troublesome in the context of pharmaceutical
innovation because the pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on a strong
patent system to attract investors due to the high cost and risk associated
with drug development.” (citations omitted)).
228. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as
Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1269–85 (2009)
(discussing conduct of patent-holders that stifles innovation, and arguing that
antitrust law fills gaps where patent law fails to curtail innovation-stifling
conduct of patentees).
229. Reply Brief on the Merits, supra note 184, at 49.
230. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
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declaring, “[I]t seems most improbable that an inventor would
choose to forfeit the benefits of patent protection because of fear
of the risk of being found tortiously liable based upon
attempting to enforce a patent obtained by inequitable
conduct.”231 This conveys a sentiment that innovation is
unaffected by concerns that any resulting invention may
subsequently become the subject of patent litigation which
results in a settlement that could potentially raise antitrust
questions—such a connection seems too attenuated. Even if
innovation were so affected, antitrust liability should be
balanced by the potential of pay-for-delay settlements to stifle
innovation. The Kewanee Oil test thus appears to weigh on the
side of no preemption.
The line of CAFC cases described in Part I.B.2, supra,
provides a better analogy to state antitrust challenges to payfor-delay settlements than the Supreme Court preemption
cases—the CAFC cases involve state claims that challenge
anticompetitive conduct of patent holders,232 as opposed to
challenges to state laws that created patent-like (or copyrightlike, in the case of Goldstein) protection for unpatentable
products. In Hunter Douglas, the CAFC created a rule for
determining whether a state commercial disparagement claim
(which, like an antitrust claim, involves the assertion of
conduct on the part of a patentee that restricts competition) is
preempted by federal patent law:
To determine whether these state law torts are in conflict with federal
patent law and accordingly preempted, we assess a defendant’s
allegedly tortious conduct. If a plaintiff bases its tort action on
conduct that is protected or governed by federal patent law, then the
plaintiff may not invoke the state law remedy, which must be
preempted for conflict with federal patent law. Conversely, if the
conduct is not so protected or governed, then the remedy is not
preempted. This approach, which considers whether a state law tort,
“as-applied,” conflicts with federal patent law, is consistent with that
employed by the Supreme Court in cases involving preemption of
state unfair competition law.233

To summarize, a state law claim in this context will be
preempted if the challenged conduct is “protected or governed

231. Id. at 1475; see also Reply Brief on the Merits, supra note 184, at 49–
50 (quoting Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
232. See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.
233. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
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by federal patent law.”234 Here, the CAFC found that patent
law immunizes a patent holder from “imposition of liability for
conduct before the PTO unless the plaintiff can show that the
patent-holder’s conduct amounted to fraud or rendered the
patent application process a sham” and that patent law also
“bars the imposition of liability for publicizing a patent in the
marketplace unless the plaintiff can show that the patentholder acted in bad faith.”235 Unfortunately, in the context of
pay-for-delay, this rule serves to return analysis to the debate
of whether a reverse payment settlement is “protected or
governed by federal patent law.” This essentially amounts to
the “scope of the patent” test: whether paying a competitor to
delay entry to the market is conduct falling within the
exclusionary scope of the patent.236 On the other hand, Dow
Chemical and Hunter Douglas suggest that an allegation of bad
faith will at least save a state claim from automatic
preemption, and proceed to a determination of the merits of the
claim.237 This element of bad faith may not be relevant to state
pay-for-delay challenges. First, early pay-for-delay-challenge
defendants failed to convince courts that their settlement
agreements should be immune to antitrust scrutiny under the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.238 Since the doctrine doesn’t apply,
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1336. The CAFC concluded that when a plaintiff’s claims
depend on a patent holder’s “conduct in obtaining and publicizing its patent, if
the plaintiff were to fail to allege that the defendant patent-holder was guilty
of fraudulent conduct before the PTO or bad faith in the publication of a
patent, then the complaint” would be preempted. Id. Similarly, in Zenith
Electronics, the CAFC held that “bad faith is a prerequisite to [plaintiff’s]
state-law tortious interference claim; without it, the claim is preempted by
patent law.” Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
236. See supra Part I.A.4.
237. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1477 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“Bad faith . . . is only one of three elements that must be established to
make out the tort.”); Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1336; In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“[F]ederal patent law preempts any state antitrust cause of action premised
on Bayer’s alleged bad faith conduct before the PTO because Count V does not
allege any conduct other than conduct before the PTO. In other words, the
state law remedies invoked by indirect plaintiffs are directed to allegedly
tortious conduct before the PTO, not tortious conduct in the marketplace.”).
238. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-31. The NoerrPennington Doctrine shields conduct that can be regarded as petitioning the
government (and thereby protected by the First Amendment) from antitrust
immunity. LESLIE, supra note 5, at 111–13. The doctrine arguably does not
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the allegation of bad faith, a requisite of the sham petitioning
exception to Noerr immunity, is unnecessary.239 Further,
whatever the CAFC’s reason for requiring an allegation of bad
faith to avoid federal preemption in state business tort and
commercial disparagement claims, state courts are not obliged
to follow suit.
The above analysis provides a basic framework to
determine whether state antitrust claims are preempted by
federal patent law in pay-for-delay settlements. State courts
facing such preemption claims should first consider whether
state antitrust challenges to pay-for-delay settlements
substantially interfere with or impede Congress’s objective to
incentivize innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.240 Next,
state courts should consider whether the challenged conduct is
protected or governed by federal patent law—where the
“conduct” is a reverse payment settlement, the preemption
question would pose merely a threshold inquiry to a court’s
consideration of the legality of reverse payment settlements.
Dow Chemical and Hunter Douglas teach that a plaintiff must
allege bad faith to avoid preemption of a claim “protected or
governed” by federal patent law, though this requirement may
not be particularly relevant to state antitrust challenges to payfor-delay settlements. Thus, it appears state antitrust claims
are probably not preempted by federal patent law.
B. . . . NOR SHOULD THEY BE
Briefly, there are several reasons state antitrust challenges
to pay-for-delay settlements should not be preempted by federal
patent law. First, state antitrust laws are the only vehicle for
indirect purchaser damage awards.241 State antitrust claims
that approximate a given federal antitrust claim are brought in
federal cases to provide an avenue for relief for indirect
purchasers.242 California v. ARC America Corp. suggests that
state indirect-purchaser remedies could provide relief only
upon success of state antitrust claims, but that they may not

apply to pay-for-delay settlements because “the anticompetitive consequences
of the exclusion payment flow from the agreement between the private parties,
not from the result of the petition to the court or from any action by that
court.” 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-31.
239. See LESLIE, supra note 5, at 112.
240. The analysis in Part II.A, supra, suggests that it probably would not.
241. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

MARSILI_PROOF(DO NOT DELETE)

890

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/12/2013 12:02 PM

[Vol. 14:2

provide relief under federal antitrust law.243 If state antitrust
claims are preempted by federal patent law in a given case,
monetary damages for indirect purchasers are foreclosed.
Perhaps this issue has been overlooked because courts may
treat state antitrust claims as counterparts of equivalent scope
to federal antitrust claims. However, state and federal
antitrust laws are not coextensive,244 and state antitrust laws
may be given a more robust interpretation than a federal
counterpart in state court.245 It follows that state court
challenges may be an attractive option for pay-for-delay
plaintiffs if state laws are potentially more likely to result in
antitrust liability. The presumption against preemption further
supports allowing plaintiffs to use the historic police powers in
areas like antitrust to challenge anticompetitive conduct in
state courts.246
Finally, at least under the framework announced in Hunter
Douglas, whether state claims can survive federal preemption
depends on whether the challenged conduct is “protected or
governed” by federal patent law, which virtually mirrors the
“scope of the patent” test for legality of pay-for-delay
settlements.247 Apart from the circularity of a standard that
would preempt a state claim based on the same legal question
the claim is meant to challenge, courts and scholars have
243. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989). The Court
opined:
Under federal law, no indirect purchaser is entitled to sue for
damages for a Sherman Act violation, and there is no claim here that
state law could provide a remedy for the federal violation that federal
law forbids. Had these cases gone to trial and a Sherman Act
violation been proved, only direct purchasers would have been
entitled to damages for that violation, and there is no suggestion by
the parties that the same rule should not apply to distributing that
part of the fund that was meant to settle the Sherman Act claims.
The issue before us is whether this rule limiting recoveries under the
Sherman Act also prevents indirect purchasers from recovering
damages flowing from violations of state law, despite express state
statutory provisions giving such purchasers a damages cause of
action.
Id.
244. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 294 Kan.
318, 341, 349 (2012) (declining to follow the Supreme Court’s application of
rule of reason analysis to a Sherman Act section 1 challenge to vertical pricefixing based on a conflicting interpretation of applicable state antitrust law).
246. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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renounced the “scope of the patent” test.248 For example, Abbott
and Michel argue that the “right to purchase exclusion that
could not have been obtained through the strength of the
patent at the time of the settlement agreement” is not one of
the rights protected by the patent system.249 Critically, the
authors argue that
the scope of the patent grant does not include the right to pay
potential competitors to stay off the market because the source of the
exclusion is the payment, not the exclusionary power of the patent.
Because the payment falls outside the scope of the patent grant,
antitrust law may judge its legality.250

These rationales further compel a conclusion that federal
patent law should not preempt state antitrust law in pay-fordelay settlements.
III. CONCLUSION
Pay-for-delay settlements have posed a legal conundrum
since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act. There currently
exists a stark division among the federal circuit courts as to the
legality of these settlements, and the legal field is awaiting a
ruling from the Supreme Court to provide guidance. Of the
various legal theories applied by the courts thus far, all are
influenced by the tension between patent law and antitrust
law. This tension is illustrated by the prospect of preemption of
state antitrust law by federal patent law. Presently, only one
pay-for-delay settlement has been challenged in state court,
and the Supreme Court of California is likely to address the
issue of preemption when it eventually decides that case. Based
on the guidance that the Supreme Court has provided on the
preemptive effects of federal patent law and on the doctrine of
preemption in general, state antitrust claims should not be
preempted by federal patent law. Concluding that they are
preempted would not be compatible with Supreme Court
precedent, nor would it be good policy.

248. See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“In our view, that test improperly restricts the application of antitrust law
and is contrary to the policies underlying the Hatch–Waxman Act and a long
line of Supreme Court precedent on patent litigation and competition.”).
249. Abbott & Michel, supra note 5, at 405.
250. Id. at 408.

